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1 Introduction and Motivation
1.1 What is Paraconsistency?
The well-studied notion of deductive explosion describes the situation where
any formula can be deduced from an inconsistent set of formulas. In other
words, in deductively explosive logics, we have {ϕ,¬ϕ} ⊢ ψ for all formulas
ϕ, ψ where ⊢ is a logical consequence relation. In this respect, both “classical”
and intuitionistic logics are known to be deductively explosive. Paraconsistent
logic, on the other hand, is the umbrella term for logical systems where the log-
ical consequence relation is not explosive. Variety of philosophical and logical
objections can be raised against paraconsistency, and almost all of these objec-
tions can be defended in a rigorous fashion. Here, we will not be concerned
about the philosophical implications of it, yet we refer the reader to the follow-
ing references for comprehensive defenses of paraconsistency with a variety of
well-structured applications chosen from mathematics and philosophy with a
rigorous history of the subject (?; Priest, 2002; Priest, 1998; ?).
1.2 Why Topologies?
In this work, we investigate the relationship between paraconsistency and some
topological spaces. As it is widely known, paraconsistency has many occur-
rences in mathematics spanning a wide range from model theory to set theory
(Priest, 2006, Chapters 2 and 3). In this paper, we present some further appli-
cations of paraconsistency in modal logic with topological semantics.
Nevertheless, the use of topological semantics for paraconsistent logic is not
new. To our knowledge, the earliest work discussing the connection between
inconsistency and topology goes back to Goodman (Goodman, 1981)1. In his
1Thanks to Chris Mortensen for pointing this work out. Even if the paper appeared in 1981,
the work had been carried out around 1978. In his paper, Goodman indicted that the results were
based on an early work that appeared in 1978 only as an abstract.
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paper, Goodman discussed “pseudo-complements” in a lattice theoretical set-
ting and called the topological system he obtains “anti-intuitionistic logic”. In
a recent work, Priest discussed the dual of the intuitionistic negation operator
and considered that operator in topological framework (Priest, 2009). Simi-
larly, Mortensen discussed topological separation principles from a paraconsis-
tent and paracomplete point of view and investigated the theories in such spaces
(Mortensen, 2000). Similar approaches from modal perspective was discussed
by Be´ziau, too (Be´ziau, 2005).
The organization of the paper is as follows. First, we will present the topo-
logical basics of our subject in a nutshell. Then, we will point out the connec-
tions between topological modal semantics and paraconsistency. Afterwards,
we will make some further observations between different types of topologies
and paraconsistency. Finally, we will conclude with possible research directions
for future work underlining the fact that the field is rather unexplored.
2 Basics
2.1 Definitions
The history of the topological semantics of (modal) logics can be traced back to
early 1920s making it the first semantics for variety of modal logics (Goldblatt, 2006).
The major revival of the topological semantics of modal logics and its connec-
tions with algebras, however, is due to McKinsey and Tarski (McKinsey & Tarski, 1946;
McKinsey & Tarski, 1944). In this section, we will briefly mention the basics of
topological semantics in order to be able build our future constructions. We give
two equivalent definitions of topological spaces here for our purposes.
Definition 2.1 (Topological Space). The structure 〈S, σ〉 is called a topological
space if it satisfies the following conditions.
1. S ∈ σ and ∅ ∈ σ.
2. σ is closed under arbitrary unions and under finite intersections.
Definition 2.2 (Topological Space). The structure 〈S, τ〉 is called a topological
space if it satisfies the following conditions.
1. S ∈ τ and ∅ ∈ τ .
2. τ is closed under finite unions and under arbitrary intersections.
Collections σ and τ are called topologies. The elements of σ are called open
sets whereas the elements of τ are called closed sets. A set is called open if its
complement in the same topology is a closed set and vice versa.
Functions can easily be defined on topological spaces. Recall that a function
is called continuous if the inverse image of an open (respectively, closed) set
is open (respectively, closed), and a function is called open if the image of an
open (respectively, closed) set is open (respectively, closed). Moreover, two
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topological spaces are called homeomorphic if there is function from one to the
other which is a continuous bijection with a continuous inverse. Two continuous
functions are called homotopic if there is a continuous deformation between the
two. Homotopy is then an equivalence relation and gives rise to homotopy
groups which is a foundational subject in algebraic topology.
2.2 Semantics
In our setting, we will denote the set of propositional variables with P . We will
use the language of propositional modal logic with the modality , and we will
define the dual ♦ in the usual sense. Therefore, we will construct the language
of the basic unimodal logic recursively in the standard fashion.
In topological semantics, the modal operator for necessitation corresponds
to the topological interior operator Int where Int(O) is the largest open set con-
tained in O. Furthermore, one can dually associate the topological closure op-
erator Clo with the possibility modal operator ♦ where the closure Clo(O) of a
given set O is the smallest closed set that contains O.
Before connecting topology and modal logic, let us set a piece of notation
and terminology. The extension, i.e. the points at which the formula is satisfied,
of a formula ϕ in the model M will be denoted as [ϕ]M . We will omit the
superscript if the model we are working with is obvious. Moreover, by a theory,
we will mean a deductively closed set of formulae.
The extensions of Boolean cases are obvious. However, the extension of a
modal formula ϕ will then be associated with an open set in the topological
system. Thus, we will have [ϕ] = Int([ϕ]). Similarly, we will put [♦ϕ] =
Clo([ϕ]). This means that in the basic setting, topological entities such as open
or closed sets appear only with modalities.
However, we can take one step further and suggest that extension of any
propositional variable will be an open set (Mortensen, 2000). In that setting,
conjunction and disjunction works fine for finite intersections and unions. Nev-
ertheless, the negation can be difficult as the complement of an open set is
generally not an open set, thus may not be the extension of a formula in the
language. For this reason, we will need to use a new negation symbol ∼˙ that
returns the open complement (interior of the complement) of a given set. We
call such systems paracomplete topological models.
A similar idea can also be applied to closed set topologies where we stip-
ulate that the extension of any propositional variable will be a closed set. In
order to be able to avoid a similar problem with the negation, we stipulate yet
another negation operator which returns the closed complement (closure of the
complement) of a given set. In this setting, we will use the symbol ∼ that re-
turns the closed complement of a given set. We call such systems paraconsistent
topological models.
Therefore, we generate two classes of logics with different (yet quite similar)
syntax and semantics. Paracomplete topological models are generated with ∼˙,∧
and  from the set of propositional variables P . Paraconsistent topological
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models are generated with ∼,∧ and  from the set of propositional variables
P . Let us now make the notation clear. We will call the open set topologies
which are the basis of paracomplete topological models as σ. Moreover, we
will call the closed set topology which is the basis of paraconsistent topological
model as τ . Therefore, we make a clear cut distinction between paracomplete
and paraconsistent logics and their models. Paraconsistent topological logic,
in this sense, is the logic with the negation symbol ∼ whereas paracomplete
topological logic is the logic with the negation symbol ∼˙. The prior uses closed
set topologies [extension of every proposition is closed] in its semantics, the
latter uses open set topologies [extension of every proposition is open].
Now, let us consider the boundary ∂(·) of a set X where ∂(X) is defined as
∂(X) := Clo(X)− Int(X). Consider now, for a given formuala ϕ, the boundary
of its extension ∂([ϕ]) in τ . Let x ∈ ∂([ϕ]). Since [ϕ] is open, x /∈ [ϕ]. Similarly,
x /∈ [∼˙ϕ] as the open complement is also open by definition. Thus, neither ϕ
nor ∼˙ϕ is true at the boundary. Thus, in τ , any theory that includes the theory
of the propositions that are true at the boundary is incomplete.
Consequently, we can make a similar observation about the boundary points
in σ. Now, take x ∈ ∂([ϕ]) where [ϕ] is a closed set in σ. By the above defini-
tion, since we have x ∈ ∂([ϕ]), we obtain x ∈ [ϕ] as [ϕ] is closed. Yet, ∂[(ϕ)]
is also included in [∼ ϕ] which we have defined as a closed set. Thus, by the
same reasoning, we conclude x ∈ [∼ ϕ]. Thus, x ∈ [ϕ∧ ∼ ϕ] yielding that
x |= ϕ∧ ∼ ϕ. Therefore, in σ, any theory that includes the boundary points
will be inconsistent. In this respect, a paracomplete topological model M is a
tuple M = 〈S, σ, V 〉 where 〈S, σ〉 is an open set topology. We associate such
model with a syntax that uses the negation symbol ∼˙. Similarly, the model
M ′ = 〈T, τ, V 〉 where 〈T, τ〉 is a closed set topology is associated with a syn-
tax that uses the negation symbol ∼, and therefore will be called paraconsistent
topological model. In each cases, we call V is a valuation function taking propo-
sitional variables from P and returns subsets of S or T respectively.
So far, we have recalled how paracomplete and paraconsistent logics can be
obtained in a topological setting. However, an immediate observation yields
that since extensions of every formulae in σ (respectively in τ) are open (re-
spectively, closed), the topologies which are obtained in both paraconsistent
and paracomplete logics are discrete. This observation may trivialize the matter
as, for instance, discrete spaces with the same cardinality are homeomorphic.
Proposition 2.3. Let M = 〈T, τ, V 〉 and M ′ = 〈S, σ, V 〉 be paraconsistent and
paracomplete topological models respectively. If |S| = |T |, then there is a homeo-
morphism from a paraconsistent topological model to the paracomplete one, and
vice versa. Moreover,M amdM ′ satisfy the same positive formula.
Proof. Since M and M ′ are paraconsistent and paracomplete respectively, they
have discrete topologies. Since their space have the same cardinality, 〈S, σ〉 and
〈T, τ〉 are homeomorphic. Call the homeomorphism f . Then, M,w |= ϕ if and
only if M, f(w) |= ϕ for negation free ϕ. The proof of this claim is a standard
induction on the length of the formula.
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Moreover, we also observe that M,w |=∼ ψ iff M ′, f(w) |= ∼˙ψ where ψ is
negation-free. 
3 Topological Properties and Paraconsistency
In this section, we investigate the relation between some basic topological prop-
erties and paraconsistency. Mostly, we will consider the closed set topology τ
with its negation operator ∼ as it is the natural candidate for the semantics for
the paraconsistent topological models.
Our work can be seen as an extension of Mortensen’s earlier work (Mortensen, 2000).
Here we extend his approach to some other topological properties and discuss
the behavior of such spaces under some special functions.
3.1 Connectedness
In the above section, we observed that boundary points play a central role in
paraconsistent theories defined in topological spaces. One of the immediate
topological properties that comes to mind when one deals with boundary is
connectedness. A topological space is called connected if it is not the union of
two disjoint non-empty open sets. The same definition works if we replace
“open sets” with “closed sets”. Formally, a set X is called connected if for two
non-empty open (respectively closed) subsets A,B, we have X = A ∪ B; then
consequently we have A ∩ B 6= ∅. Moreover, in any connected topological
space, the only subsets with empty boundary are the space itself and the empty
set (Bourbaki, 1966). Moreover, yet another notion in geometric topology is
connected component which is a maximal connected subspace of a given space.
In this respect, we can separate topological spaces into their connected compo-
nents. Also, note that connectedness is not definable in the (classical) modal
language (Cate et al., 2009).
Based on this definition, now establish a relation between connected spaces
and theories. For this reason, we now define connected formulas as follows.
Definition 3.1. A formula ϕ is called connected if for any two formulae α1 and
α2 with non-empty open (or dually, closed) extensions, if ϕ ≡ α1 ∨ α2, then we
have [α1 ∧ α2] 6= ∅. We will call a theory T connected, if it is generated by a set
of connected formulas.
This definition identifies formulas with their extensions. Therefore, a con-
nected formula ϕ is actually considered as the set [ϕ] at which it is true. Based
on the above definition, we observe the following.
Proposition 3.2. Every connected formula is satisfiable in some connected (clas-
sical) topological space.
Proof. Let ϕ be a connected formula andM = 〈W, ν, V 〉 a (classical) topological
space where for some w ∈ W , w |= ϕ. Then, define a connected subspace
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M |ϕ = 〈Wϕ, νϕ, Vϕ〉 as follows. Let Wϕ = W ∩ [ϕ]M so that Wϕ = [ϕ]M|ϕ.
Notice that Wϕ 6= ∅ as w ∈ Wϕ. The topology νϕ then is defined as follows
νϕ = {O ∩Wϕ : O ∈ ν}. It is easy to verify that νϕ is indeed a topology (in
fact the induced topology), so we skip it. Valuation V is restricted in the usual
sense. Now, we need to show that νϕ is connected.
Now, take any two formulae α1 and α2 with non-empty open extensions in
M |ϕ. Observe that if ϕ ≡ α1 ∨ α2, then [α1 ∧ α2] 6= ∅. Since Wϕ = [ϕ], and
the extensions [α1] and [α2] are nonempty by the condition, this shows that the
spaceWϕ is connected with respect to the topology νϕ. 
Note that the way we obtained a topological submodel is a rather standart
method in modal logics. A similar theorem within the context of dynamic epis-
temic logic showing the completeness of that logic in topological spaces also
used the same construction (Bas¸kent, 2011; ?).
Corollary 3.3. Every connected theory is satisfiable in some connected (classical)
topological space.
So far, we have made observations in classical topological spaces. Neverthe-
less, connected theories may be inconsistent or incomplete in some situations.
Proposition 3.4. Every connected theory in paraconsistent topological logic is in-
consistent. Moreover, every connected theory in paracomplete topological logic is
incomplete.
Proof. Let T be a connected theory generated by a set of connected formulas
{ϕi}i, so ϕi ∈ T for each i in a closed set topology. By the earlier corollary, T is
satisfiable in some connected space, say 〈W,σ〉.
Consider an arbitrary ϕi from the basis of T . Since it is a connected formula,
assume that we can write it as ϕi ≡ α∨β for [α∧β] 6= ∅. Let x ∈ ∂[α∧β] ⊆ [ϕi]
as we are in a closed set topology and therefore [ϕ] is closed. Thus, T includes
ϕi which in turn includes the theories at x. By our earlier remarks, this makes
T inconsistent in σ.
As a special case, in paraconsistent topological logic, observe that if ⊤ ∈ T
where [⊤] = W , then T is inconsistent as well. Take ⊤ ≡ p∨ ∼ p for some
propositional variable p. Then, [p ∧ ∼p] 6= ∅.
Second part of the corollary about the incomplete theories and paracomplete
models can be proved similarly. 
The converse direction is a bit more interesting. Do connected spaces satisfy
only the connected formulas?
Proposition 3.5. LetX be a connected topological space of closed sets with a para-
consistent topological model on it. Then, the only subtheory that is not inconsistent
is the empty theory.
Proof. As we mentioned earlier, in any connected topological space, the only
subsets with empty boundary are the space itself and the empty set. Thus, all
other subsets will have a boundary, and their theories will be inconsistent by
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the earlier observations. By the earlier proposition, the space itself produce an
inconsistent theory. Therefore, the only theory which is not inconsistent is the
empty theory. 
Based on this observation, we can show a more general result.
Proposition 3.6. Let X be a connected topological space of closed sets. Then, for
a collection of non-empty theories T1, . . . , Tn with non-empty intersection
⋂
i Ti,
then we conclude
⋃
i Ti is inconsistent.
Proof. Each theory Ti will have closed set of points Xi that satisfies it in the
given topology. Since,
⋂
i Ti 6= ∅, we observe
⋂
iXi 6= ∅. Therefore,
⋃
iXi is
connected and not equal to X . Thus,
⋃
iXi has a non-empty boundary and the
theories generated at the boundary points will be inconsistent. 
These observations hint out that boundary points play a significant role in
paraconsistent topologies. A basic property of boundary gives us the following
observation.
Proposition 3.7. Let X be an arbitrary connected topological space of closed sets.
Define X = {C : C = Bc for some B in X}. Then, X and X have the same
inconsistent boundary theories.
Proof. Recall that for any set S, we have ∂S = ∂(Sc). Therefore, the subsets in
X and X will have the same boundary, thus the same boundary theories. 
A similar result can be shown for paracomplete theories, and we leave it to
the reader.
3.2 Continuity
A recent research program that considers topological modal logics with contin-
uous functions were discussed in some early works (?; Kremer & Mints, 2005).
In these work, they associated the modalities with continuous functions as such:
©p = f−1(p) where© is the temporal next time operator and f is a continuous
function.
In our work, we tend to diverge from the classical modal logical approach.
Our focus will rather be the connection between continuous or homeomorphic
functions and modal logics with an hidden agenda of applying such approaches
to paraconsistent epistemic logics in future works.
An immediate theorem, which was stated and proved in variety of different
work, would also work for paraconsistent logics (Kremer & Mints, 2005). Now,
let us take two closed set topologies τ and τ ′ on a given set T and a homeomor-
phism f : 〈T, τ〉 7→ 〈T, τ ′〉. Akin to a previous theorem of Kremer and Mints, we
have a simple way to associate the respective valuations between two models
M and M ′ which respectively depend on σ and σ′ so that we can have a truth
preservation result. Therefore, define V ′(p) = f(V (p)). Then, we have M |= ϕ
iffM ′ |= ϕ.
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Theorem 3.8. Let M = 〈T, τ, V 〉 and M ′ = 〈T, τ ′, V ′〉 be two paraconsistent
topological models (where τ, τ ′ are closed set topologies) with a homeomorphism
f from 〈T, τ〉 to 〈T, τ ′〉. Define V ′(p) = f(V (p)). ThenM |= ϕ iffM ′ |= ϕ for all
ϕ.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the complexity of the formulae.
Let M,w |= p for some propostional variable p. Then, w ∈ V (p). Since
we are in a paraconsistent topological model, V (p) is a closed set and since
f is a homeomorphism f(V (p)) is closed as well, and f(w) ∈ f(V (p)). Thus,
M ′, f(w) |= p. Converse direction is similar and based on the fact that the
inverse function is also continuous.
Negation ∼ is less immediate. Let M,w |=∼ ϕ. Therefore, w is in the
closure of the complement of V (ϕ). So, w ∈ Clo((V (ϕ))c). Then, f(w) ∈
f(Clo(V (ϕ))c). Moreover, since f is bicontinuous as f is a homeomorphism,
we observe that f(w) ∈ Clo(f((V (ϕ))c)). Then, by the induction hypothesis,
f(w) ∈ Clo((V ′(ϕ))c) yielding M ′, f(w) |=∼ ϕ. Converse direction is also simi-
lar.
We leave the conjunction case to the reader and proceed to the modal case.
Assume M,w |= ♦ϕ. Thus, w ∈ V (♦ϕ). Thus, w ∈ Clo(V (ϕ)). Then, f(w) ∈
f(Clo(V (ϕ))). Since f is a homomorphism, we have f(w) ∈ Clo(f(V (ϕ))). By
the induction hypothesis, we then deduce that f(w) ∈ Clo(V ′(ϕ)) which in turn
yields that f(w) ∈ V ′(♦ϕ). Thus, we deduceM ′, f(w) |= ♦ϕ.
Converse direction is as expected and we leave it to the reader. 
Notice that the above theorem also works in paracomplete topological mod-
els, and we leave the details to the reader.
Assuming that f is a homeomorphism may seem a bit strong. We can then
seperate it into two chunks. One direction of the biconditional can be satisfied
by continuity whereas the other direction is satisfied by the openness of f .
Corollary 3.9. Let M = 〈T, τ, V 〉 and M ′ = 〈T, τ ′, V ′〉 be two paraconsistent
topological models with a continuous f from 〈T, τ〉 to 〈T, τ ′〉. Define V ′(p) =
f(V (p)). ThenM |= ϕ impliesM ′ |= ϕ for all ϕ.
Corollary 3.10. Let M = 〈T, τ, V 〉 and M ′ = 〈T, τ ′, V ′〉 be two paraconsistent
topological models with an open f from 〈T, τ〉 to 〈T, τ ′〉. Define V ′(p) = f(V (p)).
ThenM ′ |= ϕ impliesM |= ϕ for all ϕ.
Proofs of both corollaries depend on the fact that Clo operator commutes
with continuous functions in one direction, and it commutes with open func-
tions in the other direction. Furthermore, similar corollaries can be given for
paracomplete frameworks as the Int operator also commutes in one direction
under similar assumptions, and we leave it to the reader as well.
Furthermore, any topological operator that commutes with continuous, open
and homeomorphic functions will reflect the same idea and preserve the truth2.
Therefore, these results can easily be generalized.
2Thanks to Chris Mortensen for pointing this out.
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We can now take one step further to discuss homotopies in paraconsistent
topological modal models. To our knowledge, the role of homotopies as trans-
formations between truth preserving continuous isomorphisms or bisimulations
under some restrictions has not yet been discussed within the field of topologi-
cal models of classical modal logic. Therefore, we believe our treatment is the
first introduction of homotopies in topological semantics of modal logics. The
reason why we start from paraconsistent (paracomplete) modal logics is the
simple fact that the extension of each propositional letter is a closed (open) set
which makes our task relatively easy and straightforward.
Recall that a homotopy is a description of how two continuous function from
a topological space to another can be deformed to each other. We can now state
the formal definition.
Definition 3.11. Let S and S′ be two topological spaces with continuous func-
tions f, f ′ : S → S′. A homotopy between f and f ′ is a continuous function
H : S × [0, 1]→ S′ such that if s ∈ S, then H(s, 0) = f(s) and H(s, 1) = g(s)
In other words, a homotopy between f and f ′ is a family of continuous
functions Ht : S → S′ such that for t ∈ [0, 1] we have H0 = f and H1 = g
and the map t → Ht is continuous from [0, 1] to the space of all continuous
functions from S to S′. Notice that homotopy relation is an equivalence relation.
Thus, if f and f ′ are homotopic, we denote it with f ≈ f ′. But, why do we
need homotopies? We will now use homotopies to obtain a generalization of
Theorem 3.8.
Assume that we are given two topological spaces 〈S, σ〉 and 〈S, σ′〉 and a
family of continuous functions ft for t ∈ [0, 1]. Define a model M as M =
〈S, σ, V 〉. Then, for each ft with t ∈ [0, 1], define Mt = 〈S, σ, Vt〉 where Vt =
ft(V ). Then, by Theorem 3.8, we observe that M |= ϕ iff Mt |= ϕ. Now, what
is the relation among Mts? The obvious answer is that their valuation form a
homotopy equivalance class. Let us now see how it works.
Define H : S × [0, 1] → S′ such that if s ∈ S, then H(s, 0) = f0(s) and
H(s, 1) = f1(s). Then, H is a homotopy. Therefore, given a (paraconsistent)
topological modal modelM , we generate a family of models {Mt}t∈[0,1] whose
valuations are generated by homotopic functions.
Definition 3.12. Given a model M = 〈S, σ, V 〉, we call the family of models
{Mt = 〈S, σ, Vt〉}t∈[0,1] generated by homotopic functions and M homotopic
models. In the generation, we put Vt = ft(V ).
Theorem 3.13. Homotopic paraconsistent (paracomplete) topological models sat-
isfy the same modal formulae.
Proof. See the above discussion. 
In the above discussions, we have focused on continuous functions and the
homotopies they generate. We can also discuss homeomorphisms and their
homotopies which generate homotopy equivalences between spaces. In that
case, homotopic equivalent spaces can be continuously deformed to each other.
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This would give us, under the correct valuation, a stronger notion of bisim-
ulation that we call continuous topo-bisimulation. We will first start with the
definition of topo-bisimulation before introducing continuous topo-bisimulation
(Aiello & van Benthem, 2002).
Definition 3.14. Let two (classical) topological models 〈S, σ, V 〉 and 〈S′, σ′, V ′〉
be given, a topological bisimulation is a relation on S×S′, and when two points
s from S and s′ from S′ are topo-bisimular, they satisfy the following conditions.
1. The points s and s′ satisfy the same propositional variables.
2. For s ∈ O ∈ σ, there is O′ ∈ σ′ such that s′ ∈ O′ and ∀t′ ∈ O′, ∃t ∈ O such
that t and t′ are topo-bisimular
3. For s′ ∈ O′ ∈ σ′, there is O ∈ σ such that s ∈ O and ∀t ∈ O, ∃t′ ∈ O′ such
that t and t′ are topo-bisimular
Now we can extend it to continuity.
Definition 3.15. LetM = 〈S, σ, V 〉 andM ′ = 〈S′, σ′, V 〉 be two paraconsistent
(paracomplete) topological models. We say M,w and M ′, w′ are continuously
topo-bisimular (denotedM,w ⇋M ′, w′) ifM,w andM ′, w′ are topo-bisimular
and there is a homeomorphism f between 〈S, σ〉 and 〈S′, σ′〉 such that V ′ =
f(V ).
Note that in the above definition, we need a stronger notion of homeomor-
phism rather than just continuity as the bisimulation is a symmetric relation.
Theorem 3.16. Continuously bisimular states satisfy the same modal formulae.
Proof. The proof is an induction on the complexity of the formulas in the stan-
dard sense, and uses Theorem 3.8. 
What about the converse? Can we have a property akin to Hennesy-Millner
property so that for some topologies that satisfy exactly the same formulae,
we can construct a homeomorphism in between? Clearly, answer to this ques-
tion is positive if we are in finite spaces, and the construction is essentially the
same as in the classical case. We refer the interested reader to a textbook treat-
ment of classical modal logic to see how Hennesy-Millner property is treated
(Blackburn et al., 2001).
Now, mathematically oriented reader might anticipate a second move to-
wards homotopy groups and their use in modal logic. Note that homotopy
groups essentially classifies the spaces with regard to their continuous deforma-
bility to each other, and it seems feasible to import such a concept to modal
logics. Nevertheless, in order not to diverge our focus here, we will not pursue
that path here, and leave if for a future work.
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3.3 Modal Direction
This section of the paper will briefly review the modal approaches to the para-
consistency in order to make our work more self-contained.
One possible modal interpretation of paraconsistency focuses on the nega-
tion operator (Be´ziau, 2005). Under the usual alethic reading of  and ♦
modalities, one can define an additional operator ∼ as ¬, or equivalently
∼ ϕ ≡ ♦¬ϕ. Notice that this definition corresponds to our earlier definition
of negation being the closed complement. For this interpretation, recall that ♦
operator needs to be takes as the Clo operator.
The Kripkean semantics of the new paraconsistent negation operator ∼ is as
follows (Be´ziau, 2005). Let us take a modal modelM = 〈W,R, V 〉 where R is a
binary relation on the non-empty set of worlds W and V is valuation. Take an
arbitrary state w ∈ W .
∼ ϕ is false at w if and only if ϕ is true at every v with wRv
More technically, we have the following reasoning.
w 6|=∼ ϕ iff w 6|= ¬ϕ
w |= ϕ
∀v.(wRv → v |= ϕ)
w |= ϕ
Furthermore, as it was observed, ∼ modality is indeed S5, and furthermore
an S5 logic can be given by taking ∼ as the primitive negation symbol with the
intended interpretation. Nevertheless, for our current purposes, S4-character
of that modality is sufficient, and we will not go into the details of such an S5
construction. We refer the interested reader to the following references for a
further investigation of this subect (Be´ziau, 2002; Be´ziau, 2005).
Moreover, it is easy to notice the similarity of modal negation we presented
here and the topological negation that we used throughout his paper. Therefore,
it is a nice exercise to import our topological results from topological semantics
to Kripke semantics with the modal negation at hand. Therefore, one can define
a modal negation in Kripke models that reflect the exact same negation that we
used for paraconsistent topologies.
For this reason, we can offer a transformation from topological models to
Kripke models which is similar to the standard translation between classical
topological models and Kripke models (Aiello & van Benthem, 2002). Given a
topological paraconsistent model M = 〈S, σ, V 〉, we put sRσt when s ∈ Clo(t)
to get a Kripke modelMσ = 〈S,Rσ , V 〉. This transformation is truth preserving.
Theorem 3.17. Given a topological paraconsistent model M , if M,w |= ϕ then
Mσ, w |= ϕ whereMσ is obtained fromM by the transformation that wRσv when
w ∈ Clo(v).
Proof. Induction on the complexity of the formulae, and the proof is a careful
interplay between different negations. We will only show it for negation then.
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Note that we use ∼ for both paraconsistent Kripkean negation and paraconsis-
tent closed set negation; nevertheless, the context will make it clear which one
we mean.
Let M = 〈T, τ, V 〉 be given. Assume M,w |=∼ ϕ. Since, the topological
negation ∼ is the closure of the set theoretical complement, we observe that
M,w |= ♦¬ϕ. Therefore, for every closed set U ∈ τ , there is a point v ∈ U
such that M,w |= ¬ϕ. Observe that since v ∈ U for closed U , we observe that
w ∈ Clo(v). Then, put wRτv. So, in the model Mτ = 〈T,Rτ , V 〉, we have
Mτ , w |= ∃v(wRτ v andMτ , v |= ¬ϕ). Then, by the usual semantics of modal
logic, we observeMτ , w |= ♦¬ϕ which is nothing butMτ , w |= ¬ϕ. Finally, by
definition, we conclude Mτ , w |=∼ ϕ. 
A well-known transformation from Kripke frames generate a topological
space: in that case, opens are downward (or upward) closed sets (subtrees)
in the Kripke model. It is also easy to prove that this transformation respects
the truth of the formulae.
Theorem 3.18. Given a paraconsistent Kripke model M , if M,w |= ϕ then
MR, w |= ϕ where MR is obtained from M by the transformation that the closed
sets are downward closed subsets with respect to the accessibility relation R.
This establishes the connection between paraconsistent topological models
and paraconsistent Kripke models.
4 Conclusion and Future Work
In this work, we focused on the connection between topological spaces and
paraconsistent logic. There are many open questions that we have left for fur-
ther work. Some of them can be summarized as follows.
• How can we logically define homotopy and cohomotopy groups in para-
consistent or paracomplete topological modal models?
• How would paraconsistency be affected under topological products?
• What is the (paraconsistent) logic of regular sets?
Aforementioned questions pose yet another research program in which al-
gebraic topological and algebraic geometrical ideas are utilized in non-classical
modal logics. The interaction between truth and in such frameworks exhibits
a novel line of research. Moreover, region based modal logics have presented
variety of results about the logic of space (Pratt-Hartman, 2007). Considering
their use of regular sets within the framework of region based modal logics,
it is not difficult to see a connection between region based modal logics and
paraconsistent logics.
Furthermore, the strong algebraic connection between variety of topological
models pose a very interesting approach. Considering the dual relation between
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intuitionistic and paraconsistent logics and their respective algebraic structures
being Heyting and Brouwer algebras, their connection in the modal framework
was also investigated (Rauszer, 1977). Therefore, connection topological ideas
with the existing algebraic work is yet another research direction for future
work.
Yet another possible applications of such systems is epistemic logics where
the knowers or agents can have inconsistent or incomplete belief basis. The in-
tuitive connection between AGM update and paraconsistency within this frame-
work is yet to be established. Moreover, within the domain of dynamic epistemic
logic, paraconsistent announcements can be considered where agents may have
inconsistent knowledge set, and yet maintain a sensible way to make deduc-
tions. We leave such stimulating discussions to future work.
Acknowledgement I am grateful to Chris Mortensen and Graham Priest for
their encouragement and comments.
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